Hurricane consequences in the face of climate change: Case studies of two seaport clusters, Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI)



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Marine Law Symposium Roger Williams University Nov. 14-15, 2012

<u>8/28/2005</u> Hurricane Katrina hits Port of Gulfport

~\$80B damage to region \$51m direct damage to Port of Gulfport Port revenues decreased by 70% ~28' of storm surge at the Port of Gulfport

2006 Port receives \$600m in HUD funding to rebuild

2007 Gulfport elects to raise its elevation to 25' Get port out of floodplain Increase competiveness of port \$140 million for elevation component





<u>Oct. 29, 2012</u> "Super storm" Sandy



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Port of Gulfport Board: No Need to Raise Port Elevation to 25 Feet Tuesday, October 30, 2012

Mississippi Business Journal - Business Blog

By MBJ News Staff

An eagerness to shorten the time frame for upgrading the Port of Gulfport led port commissioners Tuesday to scale back plans to elevate the West Pier to 25 feet as part of a \$500 million-plus restoration and expansion of Mississippi's main seaport.

News Headlines

- OPINION Frances Fredericks: A Vision for a 'Right-Size' Port
- Port Board Decides Against 25-Foot Elevation
- Port of Gulfport Board: No Need to Raise Port Elevation to 25 Feet
- Port Authority Nixes 25 Feet Elevation for Gulfport
- Port of Gulfport Mulls Higher Pier as Tenants Object
- Gulfport Port is Meeting HUD Mandate for West Pier Work
- Gulfport Port Commission Takes No Action On Elevation Question

Sun Herald Editorial: Time to Cut

Outline

- A framework for a sector-scale adaptation process
- Storm consequences Gulfport and Providence
- Interviews vs. planning documents in Gulfport
- Lessoned learned
- Next steps




http://www.cargolaw.com/2008nightmare _jaxcrane.html








Photograph: Guy Reynolds/Dallas Morning



Gulfport and Providence







- Two highly-vulnerable US ports
 - Gulfport (Mississippi) and Providence (Rhode Island)
- Interviews of 57 key stakeholders
- Reviewed planning and policy documents





City of Gultpert What organizations make up the "port cluster"?



Gulfport, M

Environmental Agency

Emergency Management Agence

2 1989

Nonprofits/academia

Image © 2012 TerraMetrics Port of Gulfport in Cat 4 simulated hurricane (Surge layer provided by Applied Science Associates)



lat 30.362794° lon -89.102700° elev 0 ft

URI Coastal Resources Center

City of Providence (Dept. of Planning)

Save the Bay

RI Economic Developio

Waterson Terminal Services

Univar

Insurance company

Brown University

URI Dept. of Ocean Engineering

Moran Shipping Agents


Promet Marine Services

-CRMC

Providence Fire Dept.

USCG

Port of Providence in Cat 3 simulated hurricane (Surge layer provided by Applied Science Associates)





http://www.cargolaw.com/2008nightmare _jaxcrane.html

"What would be the consequences of this major hurricane hitting the port?"

Direct damage to port (DD) Delays in commerce (IC)

Providence Gulfnort

120

100

80

<u>Local and regional consequence (IntC)</u>

The big fear that I have is that the port plays such a key role and the process of the plan on what would happen if we couldn't bring in gasoline in the government should have another plan on what would happen if we couldn't bring in gasoline for cars and home heating oil and jet fuel. There was a fire at the Motiva dock four or five years ago, and that was one terminal not the whole port, and there was no gasoline in shell stations and in many stations in southeastern Massachusetts and Rhode Island and Connecticut just Labor and e consequences.


as flattened. There was as flattened. There was as Our berth collapsed. ks later, the channel [and] later they finally hip in, but it was of icted to daylight only, a vigational aids had ed down. The re was completely gone.

Labor and employment consequences Local and regional economy consequences Disruptions of normality Disaster response difficulties due to port damage Debris Business operational burdens Disruptions of critical services Difficulties in planning and development (GPT)


Risk identification

Type of consequence	Methods/data sources (examples)	Scale	Limitations
Direct damages	Replacement/repair values; disaster assistance grants; insurance losses	Facility level; regional level; state level (but difficult to determine linkages)	Does not capture full scope of impacts, does not capture links between cause and effect, hard to perform <i>ex ante</i>
Indirect costs	Input/output models, workers comp; revenues; employment stats; Insurance costs	Facility level; regional, state, national	Difficult to trace back to one sector or facility (like a port), hard to perform <i>ex</i> <i>ante</i>
Intangible consequences	Qualitative assessments	Can be used at any scale before or after an event	Difficult to assign monetary value, difficult to model, very complex, subjective

Title	Author	Туре	Year	Directs	Indirects	Intangibles	Total
	BDMJM Harris and AECOM						
Gulfport Master Plan Update 2007 Final Report	(MSPA)	Master Plan	2007	16	9	1	26
The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Mississippi's	Joint Legislative Committee on						
Commercial Public Ports and Opportunities for	Performance Evaluation and						
Expansion of the Ports	Expenditure Review	Report	2006	9	2	3	14
		Damage					
Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment Report	MSPA	assessment	2005	11	0	0	11
Dont of Culforent Destantion Dreaman Action Dian	MCDA	Master Dian	2000	2	C	1	10
Port of Gulfport Restoration Program Action Plan		Master Plan	2008	3	6	1	10
Master Planning the Port of Gulfport, Mississippi -		Dement	2007	0	0	0	0
Rebirth after Katrina	John Webb (MSPA)	Report	2007	8	0	0	8
University of Katring and Dita Implications for	Building and Fire Research						
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita - Implications for Hurricane Science and Engineering	Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology		2006	7	0	0	7
Environmental Assessment for Disaster Recovery	Standards and Technology	Report Environmental	2000	7	0	0	/
Project at State Port at Gulfport	MSPA	Assessment	2010	2	1	2	5
	IVISPA	Academic	2010	2	1	۷	<u> </u>
Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge Reconnaissance	Fritz et al	paper	2008	4	0	0	4
Read the Port of Gulfport's Restoration Program		ραρει	2000		0	0	
Description	MSPA	Press Release	2008	2	0	1	3
Sustainable Restoration of the Port of Gulfport	Reilly Morse	Report	2011	1	1	0	2
The Plan for the Implementation of the Port of		пероге	2011	<u>+</u>	<u>+</u>		
Gulfport Restoration Program	CH2M Hill (MSPA)	Master Plan	2010	2	0	0	2
Advancing in the Aftermath IV:	Loren C. Scott	Report	2007	0	1	0	1
	Multiple (STEPS community	Letter of					
Letter of opposition to HUD funding	group)	opposition	2007	1	0	0	1
		Hazard					
Maritime Severe Weather Contingency Port Plan	USCG	mitigation plan	2010	1	0	0	1
Central Harrison County Connector Highway	MDOT	FAQ	2007	1	0	0	1
Testimony of Governor Haley Barbour	Haley Barbour	Testimony	2009	1	0	0	1
Port of Gulfport Restoration Program		,					
Presubmittal Meeting	CH2M Hill (MSPA)	Presentation	2009	0	0	0	0
	State of Mississippi Emerg.	Hazard					
State of Mississippi Hazard Mitigation Plan	Management	mitigation plan	2007	0	0	0	0
Total		<u> </u>		69	20	8	97



Distinct impacts mentioned in key Port of Gulfport master planning documents



Conclusions

1. *RISK IDENTIFICATION* on a sectoral scale requires qualitative approach which is traditionally undervalued in planning and policy.


2. Disconnect between stakeholder concerns and representation in the formalized documentation about hurricane impacts upon the port and its dependents.

3. In Gulfport, the Port's investment decisions do not account for the concerns of the wider stakeholder network, in particular with respect to hurricane resistance.


Port of the Future

We need to move forward. We need to get jobs. We need to get moving out and get this behind us.

Port Commissioner 10-29-2012



A better way forward...




- Engage the full stakeholder network to better understand the breadth of consequences
- Consider the seaport as "public infrastructure" and utilize a broad range of resilience-building strategies that engage the full network of stakeholders
- Don't rely on quantitative analysis to understand the consequences of sector-level disasters

...Scholars...characterized...climate as a "wicked problem"...because of the enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders implicated by any effort to develop a solution. Climate change has been fairly described as a "super wicked problem" because of its even further exacerbating features. First, time is not costless, so the longer it takes to address the problem, the harder it will be to do so. Another [problem]...is that those who are in the best position to address the problem are not only those who caused it, but...the least immediate incentive to act within that necessary shorter timeframe... (Lazarus, 2009, pp. 1154)



Questions?



Many thanks to Roger Williams University's Marine Affairs Institute Emmett Interdisciplinary Program in Environment and Resources Stanford's Seaports2100 project

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